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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
~'rATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs . 
. JOSEPH DELBERT MARRIOTT and 
HELEN H. MARRIOTT, his wife; 
M. STEW ART MARRIOTT and LA-
URA MARRIOTT, his wife; CALEB 
MARRIOTT, a single man; GIL-
BERT ENOS MARRIOTT and HEL-
FJN A. F. MARRIOTT, his wife; and 
ETHEL TRACY, a woman, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
11088 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a condemnation case to acquire a total tract 
of land from the defendants consisting of .83 acre of 
l'aw unimproved industrial zoned property, located at 
1 
about 950 West Pennsylvania Avenue, Ogden, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The jury returned a verdict of $7,500 for the .83 
1 
acre taken and there was no remaining acreage for the I 
question of severance damages to arise. The defendant~ 
subsequently moved for a new trial which was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks an affirmation of the judgement 
on the verdict of the lower court and the matter return-
ed to the Second Judicial District in \Veber County for 
a final order of condemnation vesting the plaintiff with 
sole ownership of the subject property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff adopts the statement of facts as con-
tained in the Brief of Appellants with the following add-
itional facts and exceptions. 
The subject tract of vacant, unimproved, industrial 
land containing .83 acre was a triangular shaped piece 
of property located at the intersection of Pennsylvania 
and 26th Street at about 950 West Pennsylvania Avenue, 
Ogden, Utah. There were no structures except for a 
barn from the neighboring tract to the northeast which 
slightly encroached on subject property but was never 
considered by any of the witnesses (Tr. 54). 
The plaintiff relied on the testimony of Mr. Greg-
2 
or~' Austin, \-vho valued the .83 acre tract at $7,500. To 
support his opinion ail to the market value of the subject 
property, Mr. Austin used six comparable sales in the 
same neighborhood as the subject property, which rang-
Pd in price from $4.000 per acre to $6,750 per acre 
(ri'r. 113). 
The defendants relied on the testimony of Mr. Har-
old Welch, who valued the .83 acre tract at $35,000. In 
support of Mr. Welch's opinion, he testified to four 
sales, two on Wall A venue, one on Washington Blvd. 
and another at Plain City, Utah. The neareilt sale to 
the subject property that Mr. Welch used was about 
two miles away (Tr. 81) (Tr. 82) (Tr. 85). 
It is the plaintiff's position that the trial of this 
case ·was conducted in a manner consistent with the law 
and judicial process, and that each party had a fair 
opportunity to present all their evidence and there was 
no irregularity of a prejudicial nature that would justify 
a reversal of the judgement on the verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
COMJ\UTTED BY THE TRIAL COURT FOR IN-
QUIRING OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS AS TO 
THEIR VIEWS ON THE CONDEMNATION LAWS 
OF UTAH 
Prior to the time the partieil exercised their per-
3 
emµtory challenges m the instant case, the trial judge 
asked the members of the jury to state their views as 
to what they thought of the condemnation laws. It is 
argued h~r the eounsel for the defendants that such qups. 
tioning and responding answers set the .stage unfavor-
able to the defendants. The defendants on page 5 of 
their brief have quoted a partial statement made by one 
of the jurors. Since the quote in the Brief of Appellants 
states only that portion which is favorable to their pos-
ition, the entire statement is quoted as follows to show 
the thinking of one prospective juror: 
"I have never been a legislator, hut o t' coum 
anyone having their propert~- taken should be 
reimbursed for their fair market price of the 
property that is being taken, and in the case 
of coming right through the middle of tht> prop-
erty and rendering the portion that rnight he 
left at a less value, there certainly should he some 
consideration given. On the other hand, as a tax-
payer I don't think that any excessive payments 
or grants should be made to the property owner. 
'T'axes are high enough now" ('T'r. 20). 
A pursual of the remaining statements reveals that 
the concern of the prospective jurors, was that the con-
demnee should be ju.stly compensated. This was as pro· 
minent as any other item. There was certainly· no co111-
ment that would indicate that any prospective juror was 
going to treat the defendants in any way but fair. 
If the juror8' respon8es to the questions were ll~ 
favorable to the plaintiff as suggested hy counsel for 
4 
tlw defendants, it would appear that such questions were 
a very effective tool for the defendants to help smoke 
out any jurors who might have feelings favorable to the 
~tate. 
ln the case of State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 365 
P.2d 7~J8 (1961), this Court held that it was an error 
for the trial judge to give prospective jurors intell-
igence tests and restrict the panel to those whom the 
trial judge determined were qualified. This Court, how-
ever, went on to say that such error was not reversible 
where there was no showing that the jury was not a fair 
jury taken from a cross section of the community. The 
trial court in the instant case never attempted to re-
Rtrict the jury panel, but only attempted to expose any 
personal prejudices an individual juror might harbor 
against either party. There is certainly no showing in 
the instant case that the jury was not a fair selection 
from a cross section of the community. 
This court recognized in the case of State Bank 
of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 
P.2d 612 (1933), that after it has been determined 
that a juror possesses the necessary statutory qual-
ifications, the court may not dismiss a juror on 
its own motion. The defendants argue that if the 
trial court cannot dismiss a juror on its own motion, 
then it should not ask questions of the prospective 
jurors which would help either party to exercise its 
peremptory challenges. It is suggested that almost any 
question the trial judge asks of a prospective juror may 
result in an answer that would cause one of the parties 
to exercise its peremptory challenge. The latitude of 
the trial judge in examining prospective jurors is well 
stated by this Court in the State Bank of Beaver case 
on page 615 of the Pacific Reporter as follow8: 
" ... The examination of the jurors after it has 
been determined they possess the necessary stat-
utory qualifications whether by court or other-
wise, is for the purpose of ascertaining in the in-
dividual case their qualifications, relationship of 
the parties, their interest, pecuniary or otlwr-
wise in the subject matter of the action, whether 
or not they are united in business with either par-
ty, the state of mind of the jurors, and their pow-
ers or ability to act fairly and impartially upon 
the matter that may be submitted to them." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 47 (a), allows the trial judge to examine 
a prospective juror with the same latitude as the parties' 
attorneys. 
In the case of State v. Gregarious, 81 Utah 33, 16 
P .2d 893 ( 1933), the trial court directed a line of ques-
tions to individual members of the jury as to their views 
on certain aspects of the criminal law. This court did 
not find such line of questioning out of order but cau-
tioned that such questions should be for the purpose of 
determining the state of mind of the jurors rather than 
warnings or admonitions. The alleged improper quest-
ions directed to the jury in the instant case were not ad-
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monitions, but merely questions to determine their state 
of mind and their willingness to act fairly and impar-
tially. 
The defendants contend that the trial judge in the 
instant case committed prejudicial error by asking the 
jurors their feelings toward the law of condemnation 
and cited the case of State v. Thompson, 68 N.M. 219, 
3GO P.2d 637 (1961), for their main source of authority. 
ln the Thompson case counsel was not permitted by the 
trial court to ask the jurors about their views as to the 
law or what it should be, and such refusal was assigned 
as grounds for reversal. The New Mexico Supreme Court 
did not determine whether or not a reversal would have, 
been justified if counsel had been permitted to examine 
the jurors as to their views on the law. 
The law is clear that the extent of voir dire examin-
ation is within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and its actions will not be disturbed except on a clear 
sh01ving of abuse. The latitude in which a prospective 
juror may be examined is well stated in 31 Am. Jur. Jury 
sis 136 at 119 ( 1941), as follows: 
"The information elicited in exammmg pros-
pective jurors on voir dire serves the twofold pur-
pose of permitting the court to determine whether 
a venireman is qualified to act as juror, and aid-
ing each party in the exercise of his rights to 
peremptory challenges. Thus examination into 
the qualifications, attitudes and inclinations of 
jurors, before they are impaneled and sworn to 
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try a case, is necessarily indicent to the practice 
of challenging. Only such examination can provide 1: 
the information or suspicion to constitute a basis 
for the intelligent and practical exercise of chal-
lenges to accomplish desired-exclusion from the 
jury of those who would act from prejudice or 
interest or without qualification to judge sound-
ly." 
It is submitted that the voir dire examination of 1 
the jurors in this case was not prejudicial to the defend-
ants' case and was conducted in manner consistant with 
the trial courts discretion. 
It is further noted that the alleged error has been 
asserted for the first time on appeal and was never 
raised at the trial of the case. 
II 
PERMITTING THE JURY ':rO VIEW THE 
PREMISES IS WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRE-
TION OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND THE EXER-
CISE OF THAT DISCRETION SHOULLD NOT BE 
DISTURBED UNLESS IT IS CLEARLY DEMON-
STRATED THAT THE COlTRT ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION BY A SHOWING THAT NO USEFVL 
PURPOSE COULD BJ1J SERVED IN PERMITTING 
THE VIEW AND THAT THE EFFECT OF SITCH 
VIEW WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFEND-
ANTS WITH A LIKELIHOOD THAT THE RE-
SUL'l'S WOULD HA VE BEEN DIFFERENT IN 
rrs ABSENCE. 
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1'he law has been stated by this Court and neigh-
lioring jurisdictions, that the trial court within its sound 
di:-netion may allow the jury to view the property 
sought to be condemned, Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 
P.2d 224 (1932), Barber v. State Highway Commission, 
80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723 (1959), Wilkerson v. Grand 
1 Ri 1.'!?r Dam Authority, 195 Old. 678, 161 P .2d 7 45 ( 1945). 
'!'here is no specific rule for condemnation proceedings 
in Utah, but the authority is apparently of common law 
origin and adopted generally in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Utah R. Civ. P. 47(J), 53 Am. Jur. Trial sis 
441, G (1941 ), Nichols Eminent Domain sis 18.3 (3d ed. 
1962). 
With the statement of this general principle of law 
it would be well to review the trial transcript and evi-
dence in the instant case to determine whether or not 
any useful purpose could be derived from the jury view. 
In view of the stipulation between counsels prior 
to the trial, there can be no dispute that the acquisition 
amounted to a total taking of the tract of land belonging 
to the defendants (Tr. 46) (Tr. 47). It is also recognized 
that although the freeway was not completed at the 
time of the trial, the right of way fence was constructed 
and there was extensive excavation and construction at 
the point where the subject property had been (Tr. 39). 
One of the questions that arises is whether the jury 
eould benefit from viewing the site and the surrounding 
9 
neighborhood and streets which obviously influenced 
the value of the subject property. It is submitted that 
very little benefit could be gained if the jury were merely 
1 
taken to the site, allowed to observe where the property 
had been and then returned to the court room. The court, 
ho\vever, in its instruction to the baliff outlined a cir-
cuitous route for the jury to travel to and from the site 
which allowed them to ob3erve the sunounding neighbor-
1 
hood and streets which became important issues. 
At no time during the trial was there any dispute 
about the following physical characteristics that could 
1 
have been seen by the jury if the subject property had 
remained in its "before" condition: 
1. Frontage on Pennsylvania Avenue and 24th St. 
2. Level topography 
3. Visibility to on-coming traffic 
4. Confluence with the intersection of 26th Strert, 
Pennsylvania Avenue and the Hooper Road of-
ten referred to as the five-point3 area. 
The transcript will show that neither on cross ex-
amination of the defendants' expert witness, direct ex-
amination of plaintiff's expert witness or closing argu-
ment did the plaintiff attempt to discredit or penalize 
the subject property for lack of the physical character-
istics listed above. On the contrary the tenor of the test-
imony of Mr. Austin, plaintiff's expert witness, both 
on cross examination and direct examination, clearly 
advanced the idea that the subject property had all of 
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these desirable characteristics. At no time did Mr. 
Austin penalize the defendant's property for a lack 
of frontage, level topography, confluence with the five-
points area, visibility to on-coming traffic or acces-
sihility. The significant point of dispute was whether 
the subject property as of December, 1965, would have 
supported a service station site of the proportions 
advocated by the defendants' appraiser, Mr. ·welch. 
As the question of a service station site being the 
basis for the entire law suit, collateral issues developed 
during the course of the trial as follows: 
1. The volume of traffic on Pennsylvania A venue 
2. The type of traffic on Pennsylvania A venue 
3. The speed limit on Pennsylvania Avenue 
4. Traffic back-up on the residential streets run-
ning into Pennsylvania A venue 
5. Comparability of sales on Pennsylvania 
Avenue 
6. Whether the residential neighborhood was 
of the type that would help sttl.mul!lltel a 
$35,000 service station site 
In light of the issues that developed at the trial, a 
trip to the site and a tour of the surrounding neighbor-
hood around Pennsylvania Avenue should have been 
of some benefit to the jury to help them better under-
11 
stand the evidence and resolve the issues since the main 
points of contention were still there to be seen. 
In the Court's admonishment to the jury, it was ex-
plained to them that the view could not he considered as 
evidence, and its only purpose was to help them better 
understand the evidence. 'l'he court also cautioned the 
jury that there was a substantial construction on the 
subject property. The explanation of the court to the 
jury regarding the view and routes to travel are found 
in the transcript (Tr. 150). 
In the Brief of Appellants counsel for the defendants 
has cited a number of cases as authority for the prop-
osition that the trial court in this case abused its discre-
tion in permitting the jury view. There is very little dis-
pute with the general principles of law on jury view that 
was expounded by the appellant courts in these cases. 
It is submitted, however, that a clear distinction exists 
between the case at bar and the cases cited by the de-
fendants in which the appellant courts held that the trial 
court abused its discretion in permitting the jury view. 
In the case of Stevens v. Memmott, 9 Utah 2d 37, 337 
P.2d 418 (1959), involving the quiet title of mininf!; cl-
aims, this court held that a view of the disputed claim 
would lead as much or more to confusion as it wonl<l 
to clarity, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to permit the view. 8ince the Stevens case was 
a situation in which the party requesting the view was 
12 
refused and assigned the refusal as error, it is difficult 
to compare this case with the case at bar. rrhe same argu-
ment applies in the case of Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 
17 P.2d 224 (1932), in which the court refused to permit 
the view of a 1923 Ford Model 7 which was claimed to 
be the same type as the one in which the plaintiff was 
riding. This Court gave no clue in either the Stevens case 
or the Balle case, as to whether a reversal would have 
been warranted if the facts had been reversed, and the 
parties objecting to the view had assigned the granting 
of the view as error. In any event it is suggested that the 
facts and evidence in the instant case do not warrant the 
conclusion that the viewing of the site and the neighbor-
hood, caused the jury to be confused or prejudiced. This 
is particularly true if it is accepted that the main points 
of dispute mentioned were still present to be observed 
by the jury. 
Counsels for the defendants have cited authority 
from the Rhode Island Supreme Court to support their 
a:-:signment of error on the question of view. These cases 
are generally supportive of the general rule adopted in 
most jurisdictions and expressed in the Brief of Appel-
lants and this Brief. 
The case of Ajootion 'V. Director of Public Works, 
go R.I. 96, 155 A.2d 244 (1959), and the prior case of 
State v. Smith, 70 R.I. 500, 41 A.2d 153 (1945), said that 
the trial judge should require information regarding the 
1 ') ·" 
merits of a view when an objection is made on grounds 
other than those purely legal. The Supreme Court in the 
Ajootion case announced that since a reporter was not 
present when the request was made, it would have to 
examine the record to determine whether or not the cir-
cumstances warranted the view. After an examination 
of the record the Supreme Court then concluded that the 
customary purposes for the view were not present. rr'he 
factors taken into consideration in declaring the view 
prejudicial was the run down condition of the 2% story 
wooden frame dwelling and that the condition of the 
premises had materially changed for the worse. 
rrhe plaintiff has little argument with the rules of 
law advanced in the Rhode Island cases since the purpose 
of the view in those cases were substantially different 
from the purpose in the instant case. As pointed out 
earlier, the desirable physical attributes of the defen-
dant's property were never seriously challenged; the 
real issues could still be observed by the jury. 
In a recent Rhode Island case the Supreme Court 
recognized the value of viewing the surrounding neigh-
borhood and potential uses not withstanding the chang-
ed condition of the property being condemned. Susso v, 
Housing Authority, 82 R.I. 451, 111A.2d226 (1955). The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court on page 229 of the Atlan-
tic Reporter stated: 
'' ... the parties would probably disagree on a num· 
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ber of matters such as the accessibility of parcel 
l to :Man ton avenue, the possible development of 
railroad facilities, and the alleged interruption 
of an integrated use with parcel 2. In view of 
these circumstances and others, we cannot say 
that the trial justice abused his discretion in gran-
ting the motion for a view.'' . 
In the instant case the defendants' property in its 
"before" condition was a vacant unimproved piece of 
property which in the opinion of both valuation experts 
had a use higher than the use to which it was being put. 
The exhibits presented by both sides clearly demonst-
rated to the jury, the size and shape of the property, 
its confluence with the five-point area and its accessibil-
ity which was never in dispute. 
'l1 here are other cases in which the courts have held 
that the jury view of property, where substantial chang-
es have occured, did not constitute error or an abuse 
of discretion of the trial court. See United States v. 2.4 
Acres of Land, 138 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1943), Annot., 77 
A.L.R.2d 571 (1961),0regon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. 
v. Campbell, 34 Idaho 601, 202 Pac. 1065 (1921). Utah R. 
Civ. P. 47(J), suggests the propriety of allowing the 
jury to view the property or the place of any material 
fact as follows : 
'' Vllien in the opinion of the court, it is proper 
for the jur~· to have a view of the property wh-
ich is the subject of litigation, or of the place in 
which any material fact occured, it rnav order 
them to h~ conducted in a body under th~ charge 
1;) 
of an officer to the place which should he shown 
to them by some person appionted by the court 
for that purpose ... '' 
On page 1 G of the Brief of Appellants, counsels for 
the defendant.-; indicates how the alterations madr it 
impossible for the jury to see two important character- 1 
istics namely accessibility and view. This would be a 
legitimate argument had these two items been a point 
of dispute. The plaintiff's appraiser never penalized 
the defendants' propert>· for a lack of tltese two impor-
tant characteristics, as a matter of fact he admitted 
that the accessibility and view were good (Tr. 139) (Tr. 
140). 
The cases of South Park Com'rs v. Livin9sto111 
344 Ill. 368, 176 N.E. 546 (1931), and City of Akron v. 
Alexander, 5 Ohio St.2d 75, 214 N.K2d 89 (1966), cited 
by the defendants add very little to the general prin-
ciples regarding the discretion of the trial judge in per-
mitting a view, except to show that the courts are reluc· 
tant to construe the statutes as mandatory. 
The ease of City of Chicaqo v. Koff, 341 Ill. ;)20, 173 
NE. 666 (1930), cited by the defendants is ea:-iil~· di~­
tinguished from the instant case. In the Koff case the 
taking involved a four story brick building, the valne 
of which was one of the main points of contention. 'rhe 
Koff case shows that between the time of the taking and 
the court proceedings, which was more than four years, 
the building was still on the property but had been 
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I 
J 
vacated and had substantia1ly deteriorated in the intrum. 
ln the instant case there was no building or improv-
ment in the taking but only raw land and the physical 
characteristics of such raw land was not disputed. 
It was never the plaintiff's position that the subject 
property 1vas not a good service station site because it 
lacked frontage, visibility, accessibility or any other phys-
ical characteristic that might not have been clearly visible 
at the time of the jury view. It was merely the plaintiff's 
position that because of the type and quality of the sur-
rounding neighborhood, quality of traffic on Pennsyl-
vania Avenue and the general locality of the site, that 
it would not have supported a major service station of 
the proportions testified to by the defendant's expert 
witness. It is therefore submitted that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in permitting the jury view. 
III 
'l'Hl<J LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN PER-
i\lITrrING :MR. GEORGE M. JAY TO GIVE HIS O-
PINION AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF THE SUB-
JEC11 PROPERTY AS A SERVICE STATION SITE. 
'l'he plaintiff subpoenaed Mr. George M. Jay from 
Ogden, Utah for the purpose of giving his opinion as 
to the desirability of the subject property as a service 
station site. The testimony of Mr. Jay showed that he 
was a Sales Representative for Standard Oil Company 
with a business address at West Pennsylvania Avenue 
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(Tr. 91). l\Ir. Jay testified that he was familiar with the 
intersection of 26th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue 
prior to the construction of the freeway (Tr. 94). Mr. 
Jays discussion of desirable service station character-
istics consisted mainly of proper traffic conditions and 
neighborhood traffic ('l'r. 92) ('l'r. 93). The testimonv 
further sho'wed that it was l\f r .. Jay's job to supervise 
Chevron Stations and sell them merchandise (Tr. 91). 
Based on Mr. Jay's experience in the service station 
business, his knowledge of Pennsylvania A venue and his 
knowledge of the subject property at the intersection of 
26th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, he was asked to 
give his opinion as to what type of service station site 
the subject property would make. Over the objection.~ of 
the defendants' counsel Mr .. Jay was allowed to state 
his opinion. l\f r. Jay was not called as a valuation wit-
ness and never put a price on the subject property. 
The law with respect to review on appeal of de-
cisions of the trial court as to qualifications or compet-
ency of expert witnes.:; is generally stated in Annot., 166 
A.L.R. 1067 (1947) as follows: 
''The courts are universally agreed that the 
qualifications and competency of one to give opin-
ion evidence as an expert is primarily in the dis-
cretion of the trial court, and the admission or 
exclusion of such testimony on the grounds that 
the witness was or was not qualified to testify 
as to his opinion as an expert, will not be reviewed 
or reversed by the appellant court except where 
18 
such discretion has been abused ... '' 
In the case of Weber Baf>in Water District v. Nelson 
1l Utah 2d 253, 358 P .2d 81 ( 1960), this court held that 
the question of foundation and qualifications of a wit-
ness to state an opinion is a matter of discretion of the 
trial court and the exercise of the discretion will not 
be disturbed except in extreme cases of abuse. It is the 
plaintiff's position that the Weber Basin case is directly 
in point with this case and should be controlling. 
rrhe fact that a witness may have limited qualifi-
cations or exverience rnight tend to depreciate the weight 
of his testimony but ~would not make him incompetent 
to testify. Provo River Water Users' Assn. v. Carlson, 
103 1Ttah 93, 133 P.2d 777 (1943). This Court recently 
held in the case of State v. Taggart, 19 Utah 2d 247, 430 
P.2d 167 (1967), that: 
"It is within the province of the jury to give 
such weight to the testimony of each of the ex-
perts as the jury thought it was entitled to and 
it was for the jury and the jury alone to decide 
what weight, if any should be given to the test-
imony of any witness." (167 P.2d at 169) 
A review of the cited authorities reveals that the 
appellant courts are very reluctant to disturb the lower 
courts determination of proper qualifications and com-
petency of a witness. 
An examination of Mr. Jay's testimony shows 
that he was familiar with the area of the subject pro-
19 
perty, and that he has had con.siderable experience in 
the service station business for a number of vears . . 
On the basis of Mr .. Jay's experience and training and 
his familiarity with the area of the subject property, 
the trial court determined that his opinion as to wheth-
er the subject property was a good service station site 
was legal evidence; but it was left to the jury to deter-
mine the value of such opinion. How much weight 
the jury gave to :Mr .• Jay's opinion is not known: it 
is noted, however, that on cross examination the defend-
ants' counsel very skillfully pointed out the deficiencies 
m Mr. Jay's testimony. 
The defendants' contention.s that Mr. Jay was not 
sufficiently familiar with the subject porperty, and 
that he was not qualified to provide a foundation for 
giving an opinion would be an argument only to the 
weight of such testimony. It should be for the jury to 
determine what weight, if any, should be given to the 
testimony of any witness. 
IV 
REFERENCE MADE BY PLAINTIFF'S COUN-
SEL TO THE JURORS AS TAXPAYERS WAS NO'l' 
PRE.JUDICIAL TO DEFENDAN'rS' CASF, AND 
THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT MAK:JiJ AN ORAlj 
OBJECTION AT THE TIME SUCH REJMARK WAS 
MADE, NOR DID THEY MOVE FOR A MISTRIAlj 
OR INSIST ON A MORE SPECIFIC RULING WHEN 
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THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT SATISFY THEIR 
R.IDQUEST TO CORREcrr THE ALLEGED IMPROP-
ER REMARK, AND THE DEFENDANTS WAIVED 
ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE ALLEGED IMPROPER 
RF~MARK BY INCORPORATING THE SUBJECT 
IN 'rHEIR CLOSING REMARKS BY WAY OF RE-
BUTTAL. 
At the beginning of his closing argument, counsel 
for the plaintiff told the jury that the Marriott family 
was entitled to receive just compensation but cautioned 
them that it would be unjust to award a windfall at 
the expense of the public purse. The exact text of the 
statement regarding the public purse and taxpayers 
appears m the official transcript in two paragraphs 
(Tr. 182): 
"Now, as members of the jury you are charged 
with the responsibility of deciding the question 
of what is just compensation. Now everyone 
agrees that the Marriott family is entitled to 
receive just compensation for this property being 
acquired by the State Road Commission. On the 
other hand, it would be unjust to award a windfall 
at the expense of the public purse. 
You people are taxpayers, all of us in this court-
room are taxpayers. Now, what is this phrase, 
"just compensation" that has been mentioned 
frequently. In this regard the court has instruc-
ted you that "just compensation" shall not exceed 
the fair market value. Market value, you have 
been told, is the sum of money a willing buyer 
would pay a willing seller when both are fully 
21 
informed of the facts and neither is under am 
compulsion to bu.Y or sell.'' · 
Contrary to the defendants' interpretation of the 
above quoted statement as an attempt to extract sym. 
path~, and to appeal to the self interests of the jurors, 
the argmnent is better advanced that the tenor of the 
language is nothing more than an appeal to the jury to 
be fair to both parties and award to the landowners ju8t 
compensation. At no point in the argument was the idea 
suggested that the jurors, because they have a remote 
taxpayers interest, should resolve an:-' conflicts in favor 
of the State Road Commission. Reference to the jurors 
as taxpayers was only casually mentioned and it was 
never stated that you taxpayers must pay for this as 
indicated in the note given to the ;judge hy counsel for 
the defendants. The subject of taxpayers was never 
brought up again except in the rebuttal argument of 
counsel for the defendants, at which time he empha-
sized the status of jurorn as taxpayers b~- devoting a 
substantial portion of his rebuttal argument explain-
ing how the money for the interstate freeway system 
is raised. Some of the language used by counsel is found 
in the transcript as follows: 
"We are all taxpayers. Here in Ftah, here in 
Weber County, Kentucky, New York, or all ovrr 
the nation. These interstate freeways are utied 
bv the entire nation, big interstate truckers, lo<'al 
t~affie, everybody; you pay taxes, I pa>' taxrs 
and so do the Marriotts, but I submit to yon 
that it is entirely improper to raise this type 
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of an argument after the court has instructed 
you that you cannot extend sympathy to the 
property owner-to come in and have the State 
expect sympathy is the basis, I submit to you, 
for their case." (Tr. 189) 
In view of the ('asual reference to the taxpayers 
hy conmsel for the plaintiff compared to the remarks 
ahout taxpayers of the counsel for the defendant on 
rrlmttal, it is difficult to imagine how this exchange 
could have been a positive factor in favor of the plain-
tiff's case. It is further suggested that when counsel 
for the defendants incorporated this line of argument 
in his rebuttal remarks, he abandoned or waived any 
objections he might have perfected prior to that time, 
since mutuality of misconduct may preclude the loser 
from successfully claiming error. 
The rule is recognized in most jurisdictions that 
in order to preserve for review the question of conduct 
or argument of counsel, an objection must be made prom-
ptly. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error sis 627 (1963). Since 
the prejudicial effect of improper appeal.:; to the jurors 
self interests can in many instances, effectively be cured 
by prompt action by the trial court, ordinary rules for 
preservation of the record should be applied. 3 Am. Jur. 
Appeal & Error sis 375 (1941), 53 Am. Jur. Trial s/s 
30fi (1941), Annot., 33 A.L.R. 2d 442 (1954). If 
a proper objection has been registered by counsel, and 
the trial judge did not make a ruling or the ruling did 
not satisfy the objecting counsel, it is incumbent on the 
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objecting coum;el to direct the court's attention to the 
matter if not satisfied and insist on a ruling or request 
the court to make furtlrnr instruction whichever the case 1 
may be. Binninqham v. Gonzale.z, 183 Ala. 27:3, 61 So. 80 
(1913), Annot., 78 A.L.R. 1533 (1926), 3 Am. Jur. Appeal 
& Error s/s 375 (1941), Gobrecht v. Beckwith, 82 N.H. 
415, 135 A. 20 (1926), Annot., 52 A.L.R. 858 (1928), 
Grahm v. State, 98 Ohio 77, 120 N.E. 232 (1918), Annot., 
18 A.L.R. 1272 ( 1922). 
Many jurisdictions have held that a motion for a 
mistrial, withdrawal of the jury or a request to the 
court for such further action as may be necessary to in-
sure a fair and impartial trial, is a condition for review on ! 
appeal of alleged objectionable statements. 3 Am. Jur. , 
Appeal & Error, s/s 375 (1941). Annot., 108 A.L.R. 756, 
757 (1937) states: 
"Quite generally, however, it has been held 
that where the trial court has sustained the op-
posing counsel's objections to alleged improper 
remarks and has complied with such counsel's 
request for an instruction to the jury to disregard 
them, or that counsel be admonished or has re-
fused to sustain the opposing counsel's object-
ions to such remarks, the alleged objectionable 
statements will not he reviewed upon appeal in 
the absence of a request to the court for ;;;uch 
further action as mav be necessarv to insure a 
fair and impartial t;ial, such as ~ request for 
further instructions to the jur~- or a motion for 
mistrial, discharge of the jury, withdrawal of 
a juror, etc .. " 
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'l'he rational behind the above quoted rule is based 
on the idea that the appellant court must infer that the 
complaining counsel wa3 satisfied, and that he himself 
dirl not consider the remarks in question to be seriously 
prPjudicial to his client, or that he waived any objection. 
Annot., 108 A.L.R. 763 (1937). The Utah case State v. 
Christensen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371P.2d552 (1962), appears 
to be in line with the majority of the jurisdictions in re-
quiring a motion for a mistrial or further pressing of 
claim for prejudicial error. The Christensen case held 
that even though the cross-examination of the State's 
expert witness concerning severance damage paid by 
the State for neighboring land was improper; such 
impropriety did not constitute reversable error since 
the State did not move for a mistrial or press claim of 
prejudicial error until after the verdict was returned. 
In the instant case, a 'vritten objection to statements 
of counsel for the plaintiff was handed to the judge dur-
ing the closing argument. At no time did the trial judge 
make any comment to the jury about the contents of the 
note. After the closing argument of counsel for the plain-
tif, the record does not show any instruction by the court 
to the jury (Tr. 187). At the conclusion of the rebuttal 
argument of the defendants' counsel, the trial judge ad-
monished the jury as follows (Tr. 190): 
"I caution the members of the jury, you are not 
advocates. You are not advocates of the State 
Road Commission. Yon are not advocates of the 
private parties appearing here against the State. 1 
In this case it is an opportunity--it doesn't matter 
whether either side has or has not been fair. The 
issue is market value.'' 
rrhe instruction above quoted was clearly in response 
to the note handed to the judge during the defendants' 
closing argument. In the defendants' statement of ex-
ceptions after the jury had retired, counsel recognized 
that the court did admonish the jury but argued that 
such admonition was not clear or strong enough (Tr. 
192): 
'' ... and we believe that the admonition should 
have been much stronger and still ought to be 
given substantially clearer than anything that was 
mentioned to the jury at the close of the argu-
ment.'' 
Since counsel for the plaintiff did not request the 
court to make further instruction or dictate to the judge 
a requested instruction or move for a mistrial when 
dissatisfied with the instruction given, it should be in-
ferred that counsel was either satisfied with the instruc-
tion given, or he did not consider the remarks preju-
dicial to his case, or that he waived any objection. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that proper 
exceptions were perfected to preserve the question on 
appeal, it is the position of the respondent that the alleg-
ed improper statement made was not prejudicial and was 
harmless. 
There is no serious dispute with the cases and auth-
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orities cited by counsel for the plaintiff in his discuss-
ion of point IV. It is argued, however, these cases are 
distinguishable from the case at bar, and the cases which 
were reversed solely on the grounds of improper argu-
ment were cases in which a substantial portion of the 
closing argument was based on the idea that the jurors 
as taxpayers have an interest in the outcome of the case. 
It is also pointed out in each case that was reversed 
rnl1d.v on grounds of improper argument, that the coun-
sel for the complaining party made oral objection and 
requested that the remarks be stricken, and the trial 
judge specifically over-ruled the objection and allowed 
counsel to continue the objectionable line of argument. 
Two of the cases cited in the Brief of Appellants 
on page 25, were reversed for reasons other than im-
prnper argument, and the courts did not decide whether 
the alleged improper remarks would alone entitle the 
eomplaining party to a new trial. Sullivan v. County 
of Allegheny, 187 Pa. super-370, 144 A.2d 498 (1958), 
Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Hall, 252 Miss. 
863, 17 4 So. 2d 488 (1965). 
In the case of Eager v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 410 
P.2d 1003 (1966), involving a personal injury action, 
this Court concurred in the general rule that pleas plain-
ly designed to elicit sympathy, passion and prejudice 
~hould not be allowed. This Court in the Eager case also 
pointed out that minor errors should be disregarded 
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I 
if it is reasonable to belie\'e that tht~ parties had an opp- I 
ortunity to present their evidence and have a fair and ' 
I 
impartial trial. : 
I 
I 
This Court stated in the case of Ivies v. Richardson, i 
9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 (1959) that: 
''Reversal of a judgement is justified only when 
there is some error of such a substantial nature 
that there is a likelihood that the result would 
have been different in its absence.'' 
A statement is quoted on page 26 of the Brief of 
Appellants which constituted grounds for reversal in 
the case of Williams c. City Anniston, 257 Ala. 191, 58 So. 
2d 115 (1952). The language used in the Williams' case 
was then compared to the language used in the instant 
case as interpreted and paraphrased by counsel for the 
appellants. An examination of the -Williams' case re-
veals that the Alabama Supreme Court also pointed out 
that each time the alleged improper statements were 
made an objection was asserted, and in each instance 
the court overruled the objection. 'The court then observ-
ed that these rulings emphasized the point and indicated ' 
to the jury that payment of the verdict from city funds 
should be a consideration in deciding the case. Some of 
the following points illustrate the distinction between 
the Williams' case and the one at har: 
1. In the case at har the alleged improper remark 
was briefly stated once in counsel's introduc-
tory rema~ks to the jury. In the Williams' case 
the objectionable line of argument was much 
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stronger and constituted a substantial portion 
of the counsel's closing argument. 
2. There were several oral objections to counsel's 
closing remarks in the Williams' case with the 
trial judge each time emphasizing the point 
by overruling imch objections. No oral objec-
tions were raised during the closing argument 
in the case at bar, and the trial judge made no 
rulings which emphasized the alleged objec-
tionable statement. 
3. In the Williams' case the jurors were vary 
close to the municipal taxing. In the case at 
bar the jurors were far removed from the gov-
ernmental agency which pays 95% of the costs 
to build the interstate system. 
In the case of Anderson v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. 
Co., 107 Utah 20, 151 P.2d 465 (1944), an argument was 
made to the jury by the plaintiff that the bus company, 
a foreign corporation, would pay any judgment and 
that its property within the state could be levied upon. 
To this line of argument the Utah Supreme Court on 
page 464 of the Pacific Reporter states that: 
"Fnless counsel, by such argument invited 
or admonished the jury to resolve any doubt it 
might have as to the facts in favor of the plain-
tiff in view of the financial responsibility of the 
corporate defendant, it is difficult to see how the 
jury might think jt relevant." 
The announcement to the jurors that they are tax-
payers should not have surprised or aroused their pre-
judices since they were well aware of their status. The 
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Kentuckv Supreme Court made a co111111on sen· e b .J • ~ o ser-
vation when it stated: 
" .. .it must be assumed that the members of the 
jury were reasonably intelligent men and knew 
that a judgment against the commonwealth wou-
ld necessarily have to be paid out of taxes coll-
ected by it." Commonwealth v. Hoover's Admi11- · 
istration, 274 Ky. 472, 118 S.W.2d. 741 (1938). 
In the Brief of Appellants on page 28 and 29, the 
cases of West v. State, 150 S."W.2d 3G3, (Tex. Civ. App. 
1941), and Doty v. Jacksonville, 106 Fla. 1, 142 So. 599, 
(1932), were cited for the proposition that highly pre-
judicial statements need not be objected to in order to 
obtain a reversal. A reading of the objectionable state-
ments quoted in the Brief of Appellants clearl~v reveal.5 
that there is no comparability between these statements 
and the statement made in the instant case. It is also 
disputed that the last two cited cases held that preju-
dicial error resulted even in the absence of an objection. 
In both cases the court specifically pointed out that ob-
jections were raised and overruled. In the vV est case the 
exceptions were not asserted to the objectionable state-
ment when made in the opening arguments, but the same 
statements on closing argument were very strenuously 
objected to and overruled by the court. It was the Su-
preme Court's position, that the objection had been prop-
erly raised but added by way of dictum that the state 
ments were so prejudicial that a reversal should be re-
quired in the absence of an objection. 
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The written objections handed to the trial judge by 
counsel for the defendants did not ask the judge to in-
struct the jury to disregard such statement, nor did it 
request any other specific action but only asked the 
trmrt to admonish. If the defendants were unhappy with 
thr instructions given by the judge, or if they considered 
that no instruction was made, there was plenty of opp-
ortunity before the jury retired to press for a specific 
ruling or further instruction. 
lt is submitted that the outcome in the instant case 
would have been the same in the absence of the alleged 
improper remark made by the plaintiff's counsel. The 
transcript will show that the evidence was in favor of 
the plaintiff's position. This was not the type of case 
in which the jury was likely to compromise their verdict 
between the position of the landowner and the position 
of the Utah State Road Commission. Once the jury 
was convinced that the site was not of the type that 
would attract a $35,000 offer from a major oil company, 
there was no place for them to rest their decision except 
on the testimony of the witness used by the plaintiff. 
v 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS NOT COMMIT-
TED IN THE TRIAL COURTS INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY. 
The answer to the defendants' argument that no 
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instructions were given which corrected the alleged irn. 
proper remark of plaintiff's counsel or cautioned the 1 
jury against sympathy and generosity toward the State, 
is that the defendants did not request such instruction~. 
1 
Thi3 Court recently held in the case of the State of Utah . 
by and through its Road Conmiission v. Kendall, No. 
10834, March 5, 1968, that: 
"The law is to the effect that where no request 
is made for an instruction at trial, a party can-
not complain on appeal because the court did not 
give such unrequested instruction.'' 
The case of Salt Lake & U. R. Co. v. Schramm, et al., 56 
Utah 53, 189 Pac. 90 (1920) stated that: 
''If the plaintiff desired more specific instruc-
tions than given by the court, it became the duty 
of the plaintiff to frame and present them for the 
court's consideration. This the plaintiff did not 
do ... not having made a written request to the 
court to charge the jury in the particular3 com-
plained of, the court's failure to do so will not be 
regarded as an error ... " (56 Utah at 57). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 51, also states that: 
'' ... no party may assign as error the giving or the 
failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto ... '' 
One of the courts instructions did however caution the 
jury to disregard the public character of the plaintiff 
(Tr. 164) : 
It is your imperative and sworn duty to he~ 1: 
and determine this case precisely the same as 11 
~2 
r 
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it were between individuals. The mere fact that 
the plaintiff is the State of Utah and the defen-
dants are private individuals should make no dif f-
erence whatever to you. 
You should look solely to the evidence for the 
facts and the instructions given you by the court 
for the law and return a true and just verdict 
according to the facts established by the evidence 
under the law as laid down by the court, without 
reference to the individual or private character 
of the defendants or to the public character of the 
plaintiff. 
The defendants' contention that the trial court 
emphasized, repeated and gave unbalanced instructions 
in favor of the plaintiff is not supported by the record. 
The trial court in both instructions No. 8 and 9 made 
reference to burden of proof. 1~ven though the phrase 
"burden of proof" is used in both instructions, it is 
stated in different ways and the two instructions are 
attempting to clarify a certain point. Instruction No. 
8 talks about burden of proof generally and instruction 
No. 9 set out an example for purposes of clarity. 
It is submitted that the instructions of the trial court 
should not he declared repetitious and prejudicial as 
long as the instructions in question tend to add clarity 
on a particular point. Only after the instructions in ques-
tion cease to add clarity and only repeat the same thing 
over ~everal times should the question of prejudicial 
emphasis and repetition arise as grounds for reversal. 
One of the trial court's instructions specifically caution-
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ed the jury about instructions stated m varymg ways 
(Tr. 164): 
No. 17 
''If in these instructions any rule, direction or 
idea be stated in varying ways, no emphasis there-
on is intended by me, and none should be inferred 
by you. For that reason, you are not to single out 
any certain sentence or any individual point or 
instruction and ignore the others, but you are to 
consider all the instructions as a whole and are 
to regard each in the light of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given 
has no significance as to their relative import-
ance.'' 
The defendants have cited several cases on page 
34 and 35 in the Brief of Appellants in which the courts 
have expressed their disapproval of instructions which 
tend to give undue prominence or emphasis on a point 
that is favorable to either side. The case of Evans r. 
Holsinger, 242 Iowa, 870, 48 N.W.2d 250 (1951), was re-
versed for grounds other than emphasized instructions, 
but the Iowa Supreme Court cautioned that the three 
questionable instructions which were in essence dupli· 
cates should be avoided on retrial. This Court in the 
case of Shields v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah 
307, 105 P.2d 347 (1940), declared that it was error 
for the trial court to permit portions of the city ordin-
ance as well as identical sections of the statute to be 
read to the jury together with an explanation of how 
the laws were to apply to the facts. 
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The facts in the instant case are substantially 
different from the facts in the Shields case and the other 
eited cases in which the courts have ruled instructions 
to be prejudicially repetitious. In the instant case 
the two instructions in question should not be con-
8idered repetitious since they would both tend to clarifv 
a particular point. Even assuming they were repeat-
ing to the jury the same proposition, it is evident that 
the degree of repetition does not even approach the 
point where it would likely have a prejudicial influence 
on the outcome of the trial. This is particularly true 
if the instructions are considered as a whole and no 
individual point, instruction or sentence is singled out 
as cautioned against by the trial court (Tr. 168). 
The defendants have raised a vigorous objection 
to lnstruction No. 8. This instruction tells the jury 
to reject the contentions advanced by the defendants 
if they find the evidence to be evenly balanced. The 
defendants argue that this instruction made it manda-
tory for the jury to return a verdict on the figure test-
ified to by either the defendants or the plaintiff. 
The case of State of Idaho ex. rel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 
ii Idaho 95, 286 P.2d 1112 (1950), is cited by the defend-
ants in support of their assignment of error on this 
point. In the last cited case the courts' instruction 
~pecifically told the jury that if they find that the 
landowners have not sustained the burden of proof in 
Pstablishing value, then their verdict shall not be in 
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excess of the state's values. rrhis instruction is the 
"all or nothing" instruction which is snhstantially rlif-
ferent from the instruction in the instant case. Then, 
is nothing in the trial eourt 's instructions in the instant 
case which suggests tliat the jm·y is bonnd to adopt 
the figures of the plaintiff if the defendants have not i 
met their burden of proof. On the contrary, if the 
Instructions are considered as a whole as the trial conrt 
instructed the jury to do, it will be observed that such 
instructions gave the jury permission to arrive at an 
independent figure. One of the trial court's instructions 
to the jury stated (Tr. 172): 
No. 21 
" . If you should decide that the defend-
ants are entitled to recover, in discussing the 
amount of damages to he awarded, you prohahly 
could ascertain from each juror his own inde-
pendent judgment as to what the amount should 
be. if vou should so wish to do . . . whereupon, 
it wm{ld he your duty to thoughtfully consider 
the amounts so suggested, to test them in the 
light of the law and the evidence, and after de· 
liberation thereon, to determine which, if any, 
of such individual estimates was proper ... '' 
Other instructions of the trial court clearly explain 
to the jury that they are not bound b~T the opinion 
of any witness: 
'' ... vou shonld consider snch expert opinion 
and sho~lld weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. 
You are not bound, however, by such opinion. 
Give it the weight to which you deem it entitled. 
~() 
·whether that be great or slight, and you may 
reject it if in your judgment the reasons given 
for it are unsound" (Tr. 190). 
''Where there is a conflict in the evidence, 
you should reconcile such conflict as far as you 
reasonably can, but where the conflict can"not 
be reconciled, you are the final judges and must 
be determined from the evidence what the facts 
are. . . You are not bound to believe all that 
the witnesses have testified to, or any witness 
or class of witnesses ... " (Tr. 163). 
The above quoted instructions clearly permitted 
the jury to adopt a figure that is different from that 
of either the plaintiff or the defendant. There is no-
thing in the instructions that suggests to the jury that 
the plaintiff has devised a magical formula for deter-
mining market value which must be adopted if the 
defendants fail to prove their case by a preponderance 
of the evidence. The word rejection would properly 
suggest to the jury that they cannot adopt the figures 
of the defendants if the burden of proof has not been 
met, but it certainly does not require or suggest the 
adoption of the plaintiff's figures. 
CONCLUSION 
A discussion of the points in this Brief and a re-
view of the record should clearly demonstrate that the 
defendants had a fair trial with the opportunity to pre-
sent all of their evidence to the jury. 
It cannot be assumed that simply because the jurors 
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chose to adopt the figures of the plaintiff's expert wit- I 
ness that their verdict was unfairly and prejudicially : 
influenced. The defendants have argued numerous points i 
which they feel have influenced the outcome of this ca~e. ' 
One controlling factor which has been grossly overlooked, 
is the evidence itself which appear:::; to have been eclipsed 
in a smoke screen of rntionalization and ·Monday morn-
ing quarterbacking. A review of the evidence presented 
in this case will leave no doubt as to what factors rnoti 
vated the jury to return a verdict exactly on the plain-
tiff's figures since the evidence was heavily in favor of 
the plaintiff's position. 
It is respectfully submitted that the parties pre-
sented two distinct alternatives for the jury. One alter-
native was to adopt the theory that the subject property 
was a prospective site for a major service station. Thr 
other alternative was to adopt the view that the subject 
property was best suited for industrial and related activ-
ities. There was nothing in between on which the jurors 
could rest their decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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